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REFORM.(\.TION OF INSTRUMENTS-MISTAKE-DEED OF MARRIED
WoMAN-In 1887 one Evans deeded to Mattie Woodbridge a lot described in
the deed as lot 3 I, believing that the lot described was lot 29. Mattie took
possession of lot' 29, and held it until October 7, 1913, when she deeded :it by
the same description as in the original deed to one Casto, an intermediary, who
then deeded it to William, Mattie's husband. Husband and wife continued in
possession of lot 29 until her death in 1919. Lot 31, the lot described in the
deed of 1887, continued in the possession of Evans and his successors until
1905, when it was deeded to Mattie. She then took possessi~n and continued
to hold and possess lot 31 until 1919. When Mattie died, William took a life
estate in all her realty, remainder to Mattie's heirs. The misdescription in the
deeds was first discovered when Mattie's heirs brought suit after William's
death in 1939 for the partition of the real estate of which Mattie had died
seised. Prayer of the present suit was that William Woodbridge be declared
to be the true owner of lot 29, and that, if necessary for the purpose, the deeds
from Mattie Woodbridge to Casto, and from Casto to William Woodbridge
be reformed to effectuate the true intentions of the parties to the deeds. Held,
under the law as it existed on October 7, 1913,1 equity will not reform a deed

1 W. Va. Code Ann. (Hogg, 1913) § 3671: "Any married woman may take
by inheritance or by gift, grant, devise or bequest, from any person other than her
husband, and hold to her sole and separate use, and convey and devise real and personal
property and any interest or estate therein, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, in
the same manner, and with like effect as if she were unmarried ...•"

1 947]

RECENT DECISIONS

made by a married woman to cover land it was intended to include but failed to
so include by reason of mutual mistake of fact. Stealey v. Lyons, (W. Va. 1946)
37 S.E. (2d) 569.
Earlier statutes, giving a married woman the right to convey her own property, but retaining restrictions on her power to contract, made possible the unfortunate result of the principal case, in which reformation of an executed
conveyance by the married woman was refused even though a mistake in expression was clearly proved. This result rests on an analysis of the reformation
remedy as essentially a remedy for specific enforcement of contract; since the
grantor lacks the power to contract, the correction of the deed through proof
of the unexpressed intent is precluded. The conclusion reached in the principal
case finds support in decisions in other states, rendered during the intermediate
period while the rules as to married women's capacity were in -a process of piecemeal extension.2 That it is not an inevitable conclusion is indicated, however,
by an Indiana decision of the same period, in which r.eformation was granted at
the suit of a grantee from the- married woman for a mistake in the description of
the proper~ conveyed. The reason given for awarding reformation was essentially the inequity of permitting an executed conveyance, completely conforming
to statutory requirements for an effective deed, to stand uncorrected when it
failed to accomplish the intended object.3 On this analysis reformation of the
deed does not depend on the enforcement of a contract independent of and
differing from the language of the deed; the married woman's power to convey has already been effectively exercised and the written document in which her
intent is expressed is reformed in order to avoid what would otherwise be an
unjust distortion of her own purpose as grantor.4 While this reasoning involves
a refinement of analysis, it is strongly supported by results in the analogous situation of contracts within the Statute of Frauds, where reformation is sought by
the use of parol evidence which would be insufficient for purposes of specific performance of contract. While a difficulty similar to that felt by the court in the
principal case has led the Massachusetts court to refuse reformation of an executed deed for the purpose of adding to ( rather than subtracting from) the
grant,5 most courts reject any such limitation in the case of executed deeds. 6
This problem has largely been done away with by modern statutes. The married
woman has capacity to contract in all jurisdictions, and her power to confract is
that of a feme sole in most states. In the latter case there is no doubt that she
may make any contract which a competent man could make, and that she wlll
be held liable on such a contract in the ordinary way.7 Some statutes, however,
give the wife only the power to make contracts relating to her separate estate.
2

Martin v. Hargardine, 46 Ill. 322 (1868); Petesch v. Hambach, 48 Wis. 443,
4 N.W. 565 (1880); Shroyer v. Nickell, 55 Mo. 264 (1874).
8
Hamar v. Medsker, l'io Ind. 413 (1878).
4
Styers v. Robbins, 76 Ind. 547 (1881); see also 7 CENT. L. J. 434 (1878); id.
182; 8 CENT. L. J. 42 (1879).
5
Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24 (1869).
6
3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed. § 867 (1941). It is virtually
impossible to classify the decisions involving reformation of an executory contract relating to land, and within the Statute of Frauds, but many American authorities allow
its reformation whether a deed has subsequently been executed in conformity with the
written contract, or not.
7
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS,§ 47 (1931).
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This provision is interpreted in various ways. It includes whatever is necessary to the full enjoyment and use ~f the property, but does not include contracts
that may be only of some incidental benefit. 8 An executory contract by a married woman to purchase property has been held by most, though not all, courts
to be a contract in relation to her separate estate. 9 Surety contracts are in some
jurisdictions expressly forbidden, and sometimes held not to relate to her separate
estate. Generally this does not of itself prevent her from conveying, mortgaging
or pledging her separate estate to pay or secure the debt of another. As stated by
a Pennsylvania court, " .•. what the statute prohibits is the incurring of a personal liability for the forbidden purpose, a liability that carries the risk of a general judgment." 10 On the other hand, some statutes specifically provide that
such a conveyance cannot be made. To the extent that limitations on the married woman's power to contract survive, concurrently with broad powers to
convey her separate estate, difficulties of the sort experienced by the court in the
principal case may be expected to arise where reformation is sought of her executed transfers. It is to be hoped, however, that a closer analysis of the nature
and effect of the reformation remedy will permit its use so as to give effect
to a clearly proved but inaccurately expressed intent.11 '

Eugene H. Lattin

8 Russel v. People's Savings Bank, 39 Mich. 671 (1878).
9 MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTIC RELATIONS, § 47 at p. 139 (1931); but see
Jones v. Crosthwaite, 17 Iowa 393 (1864).
10 Herr v. Reinoehl, 209 Pa. 483 at 487, 58 A. 862 (1904).
11 See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, § 152 (1935), for statement of the
law in all states.

